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“Congress . . . intended in the Fair Sentencing Act to repeal and redress the 
wrongs of the older crack sentencing statute that Congress believed had proven itself 
to be arbitrary, irrational, and racially discriminatory.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The year is 1995. Imagine Andre, who grew up in inner city Cleveland and has 
an eighth grade education. Two years before, and shortly after his eighteenth 
                                                           
 * Jeffrey B. Lazarus is an attorney for the Federal Defender’s Office for the Northern 
District of Ohio. Mr. Lazarus received his J.D. from Case Western Reserve University Law 
School and was admitted to the Ohio bar in 2005. He is also an adjunct professor at Case 
Western Reserve University Law School. Many thanks go to the other Federal Defenders who 
have been working with Mr. Lazarus on litigating these crack cocaine disparity issues in the 
courts, including: Dennis Terez, Melissa Salinas, Amy Cleary, and Christine Sason. 
 1 United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2013); reh’g en banc granted, 
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15872 (6th Cir. July 11, 2013). 
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birthday, Andre was arrested two separate times for selling crack cocaine to an 
undercover officer. He received probation and went back onto the street. In 1995, 
Andre was arrested for possessing sixty grams of crack cocaine, clearly not an 
amount for personal use. Due to the amount, the federal prosecutors chose to charge 
Andre with a federal drug offense.2 Because he possessed over fifty grams, and 
because he had two prior drug offenses, Andre faced a sentence of mandatory life in 
prison.3 After a short trial, Andre was convicted and sentenced to life in prison, 
despite having no history of violence in his past or in this offense. Today, Andre is 
now thirty-nine years old and will die in prison because in the federal system “life” 
means life without the possibility of parole.4 
Andre is not unique. There are literally thousands of people serving mandatory 
life sentences for crack cocaine offenses in federal prison.5 Approximately eighty-
five percent of them are African-American.6 For decades, defense lawyers have been 
challenging, without any success, the disproportionate federal sentencing laws for 
crack cocaine, compared to powder cocaine, as both being irrationally harsh and 
having an unfair impact on African-Americans.7  
In 2010, Congress passed and the President signed legislation to “restore 
fairness” to the federal crack cocaine laws by enacting the Fair Sentencing Act.8 
Were Andre sentenced under the Fair Sentencing Act, he would receive a mandatory 
minimum sentence of ten years, as opposed to a mandatory life sentence.9 This 
legislation, however, did not explicitly state whether it could apply retroactively to 
those already serving these harsh sentences.10 As a result, federal courts have refused 
to grant relief to defendants sentenced prior to the passage of the Fair Sentencing 
Act;11 Two narrow exceptions are detailed herein. Thus, despite legislation that the 
                                                           
 2 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (West 1995).  
 3 Id. 
 4 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) 
(Congress abolished parole in federal sentences, meaning that “life” means life without the 
possibility of release in the federal system.); Skowronek v. Brennan, 896 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 
1990).  
 5 Blewett, 719 F.3d at 484. 
 6 United States v. Doe, 731 F.3d 518, 520-21 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Kimbrough v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 85, 98 (2007)). 
 7 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 962 F.2d 1218, 1227 (6th Cir. 1992); United States 
v. Pickett, 941 F.2d 411, 418 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Galloway, 951 F.2d 64, 66 (5th 
Cir. 1992); United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751, 753-56 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Thomas, 900 F.2d 37, 39-40 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245, 1248 
(D.C. Cir. 1989).  
 8 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).  
 9 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (West 2013). 
 10 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). 
 11 United States v. Carradine, 621 F.3d 575, 580 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Gomes, 
621 F.3d 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 909 n.7 (8th 
Cir. 2010); United States v. Lewis, 625 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Diaz, 627 F.3d 930, 931 (2d Cir. 
2010); United States v. Doggins, 633 F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Baptist, 
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old sentencing scheme has been declared to be wrong and unfair, Andre must still 
languish in prison under the old penalties for the rest of his life.  
Such a result is unjust and unfair. This article advocates for the retroactive 
application of the Fair Sentencing Act. Part II of this Article will detail the history of 
the federal crack cocaine sentencing laws, from 1986 through the passage of the Fair 
Sentencing Act. Part III will detail the recent cases dealing with attempts at 
retroactivity in the lower courts. Part IV outlines the Supreme Court’s holding in 
United States v. Dorsey,12 which was a ground-breaking step towards the FSA’s 
retroactive effect. Part V offers arguments in support of retroactivity. Part VI offers 
legal challenges in which inmates can seek relief in the courts. In Part VII, we will 
leave the courtroom and offer policy reasons why the retroactivity of the Fair 
Sentencing Act does not just benefit those serving crack cocaine sentences, but is a 
benefit to the public as a whole.13 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING LAWS 
In 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act,14 which set forth federal 
laws regarding illegal drugs. The statute delineated specific drugs, and set forth 
penalties relative to each drug and amounts.15 The statute created “mandatory 
minimum” sentences—sentencing floors—which a federal judge cannot go below 
unless narrow factual circumstances are present.16 Generally, the statute set drug 
quantity thresholds, which invoked no mandatory minimum,17 a five-year mandatory 
minimum,18 or a ten-year mandatory minimum.19 The five-year mandatory minimum 
could be escalated to ten if the defendant had a prior drug felony.20 The ten-year 
mandatory minimum rose to twenty years with a prior drug felony, and mandatory 
life with two prior drug felonies.21 
                                                           
646 F.3d 1225, 1226-28 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Bullard, 645 F.3d 237, 248-49 (4th 
Cir. 2011); United States v. Goncalves, 642 F.3d 245, 252-55 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Powell, 652 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 12 Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012). 
 13 For the sake of brevity, the Fair Sentencing Act will henceforth be referred to as the 
FSA. 
 14 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
 15 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1) (West 1986). 
 16 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(e) (West 2010); 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5G1.1, 5K1.1 (2004); Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 289-90 
(1996).  
 17 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(C) (West 2009) (current version at 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(C) 
(West 2010)). 
 18 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(B) (West 2009) (current version at 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(B) 
(West 2010)). 
 19 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A) (West 2009) (current version at 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A) 
(West 2010)). 
 20 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(B) (West 2009) (current version at 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(B) 
(West 2010)). 
 21 Id.  
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Crack cocaine and powder cocaine were separately dealt with in the Anti-Drug 
Abuse statute.22 Some courts have rejected any chemical difference between crack 
and powder cocaine, and have concluded the law should not treat the two 
differently.23 Cases involving five hundred grams of powder cocaine invoked the 
five-year mandatory minimum, whereas possession of only five grams of crack 
cocaine triggered the same mandatory penalty.24 Furthermore, a case involving five 
thousand grams of powder cocaine triggered the ten-year mandatory minimum, but a 
case involving fifty grams of crack cocaine had the same penalty.25 Thus, any 
defendant with fifty grams of crack cocaine and two prior drug felonies would be 
sentenced to mandatory life in prison.26  
The United States Sentencing Commission oversees the enactment and 
maintenance of federal sentencing guidelines, which aim to promote “certainty and 
fairness in sentencing and reducing unwarranted sentence disparities.”27 In response 
to the Anti-Drug Abuse statute, the Sentencing Commission set offense levels to 
reflect the mandatory minimums set forth in the statute.28 The Supreme Court has 
held that this was done because the Sentencing Commission wanted to “keep similar 
drug-trafficking sentences proportional.”29 Thus, since the passage of the Anti-Drug 
Abuse statute, proportionality in sentencing for drug crimes has always been the 
paramount concern. 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Congress’s statutory choice to treat crack 
cocaine so harshly, as compared to powder cocaine, received significant challenge 
and criticism. Allowing a mandatory minimum for crack cocaine quantities that were 
one percent the amount to trigger the same penalties for powder cocaine came under 
scrutiny. This came to be referred as the “one hundred to one ratio”.30 For example, 
consider two defendants, both with a prior drug felony. One defendant has four 
hundred and ninety-nine grams of powder cocaine, but will not receive any 
mandatory minimum.31 Another defendant has six grams of crack cocaine, and as a 
                                                           
 22 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B) (West 2009) (current versions at 21 U.S.C.A. § 
841 (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B) (West 2010)). 
 23 See United States v. Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d 633, 641 (N.D. Iowa, 2009) (“Special 
Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (April 1997) . . . strongly suggests 
that the distinctions between the two controlled substances are artificial, at best. . . . [T]he 
prosecution offered no argument or logical reason why crack cocaine and powder cocaine 
should be treated differently, on the basis of the controlled substances themselves.”).  
 24 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (b)(1)(B) (West 2009) (current version at 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 
(b)(1)(B) (West 2010)). 
 25 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (b)(1)(A) (West 2009) (current version at 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 
(b)(1)(A) (West 2010)). 
 26 Id. 
 27 28 U.S.C. § 994(f) (2006).  
 28 Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (2012). 
 29 Id. at 2328; Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 97 (2007).  
 30 See, e.g., Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 97; United States v. Doe, 2013 WL 4792135, at *1 
(6th Cir. Aug. 27, 2013). 
 31 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(C) (West 2009) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(C) 
(West 2010)). 
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result will be subject to a mandatory minimum of ten years.32 Such a penalty 
structure did not achieve the Sentencing Commission’s goal of uniformity and 
proportionality in federal sentencing.33 Furthermore, there was significant racial 
disparity as a result of these disproportionate penalties. 
As a result of these crack cocaine mandatory minimum penalties, thousands of 
defendants (an overwhelming majority of which are African-American) were 
convicted for crack offenses and are currently serving mandatory sentences of 
twenty years or life.34 The racially discriminatory impact of the crack cocaine 
sentencing scheme showed that nearly one hundred percent of all crack defendants 
were non-white.35 In fact, from 1988 to 1995, federal prosecutors prosecuted no 
whites under the crack provisions in seventeen states, including major cities such as: 
Boston, Denver, Chicago, Miami, Dallas, and Los Angeles.36 In 2010, the Chairman 
of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Patrick Leahy, called this disparity in 
sentencing “one of the most notorious symbols of racial discrimination in the 
modern criminal justice system.”37 
Given this unwarranted disparity, defense attorneys challenged the sentencing 
disparities between the powder and crack cocaine penalties throughout the 1990s and 
2000s.38 Twenty-one years after the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse statute, the 
Sentencing Commission passed retroactive guideline amendments.39 These 
retroactive amendments allowed defendants sentenced for crack cocaine offenses to 
receive a two-level reduction in their base offense levels.40 While these amendments 
                                                           
 32 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(A) (West 2009) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(A) 
(West 2010)). 
 33 Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2328 (citing Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 97-98; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 53-54 (Oct. 2011)). 
 34 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATEMENT OF JUDGE PATTY SARIS TO THE UNITED STATES 
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: REEVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FEDERAL MANDATORY 
MINIMUM SENTENCES 3 (Sept. 18, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATEMENT OF 
JUDGE SARIS], available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/ 
Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Submissions/20130918_SJC_Mandatory_Minimums.
pdf.  
 35 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.34 
(2011) [hereinafter U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK] (94% non-white); LaJuana 
Davis, Rock, Powder, Sentencing—Making Disparate Impact Evidence Relevant in Crack 
Cocaine Sentencing, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 375, 386-88 & n.68 (2011).  
 36 Dan Weikel, War on Crack Targets Minorities Over Whites, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1995, 
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-05-21/news/mn-4468_1_crack-cocaine ; United States v. 
Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2013).  
 37 156 CONG. REC. S1683 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2010). 
 38 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
 39 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AMENDMENT 706 (effective Nov. 1, 2007).  
 40 Id. 
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allowed defendants to receive reductions from their sentencing guideline ranges, all 
mandatory minimums sentences were unaffected and remained in place.41 
On August 3, 2010, Congress passed, and the President signed, the Fair 
Sentencing Act.42 The FSA increased the threshold amounts of crack cocaine which 
trigger the respective mandatory minimums.43 To invoke the five-year mandatory 
minimum, a defendant must possess twenty-eight grams, raised from five grams.44 
For the ten-year mandatory minimum, a defendant must possess two hundred and 
eighty grams, raised from fifty grams.45 The FSA also directed the Sentencing 
Commission to pass amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines to reflect the 
statutory changes.46 Soon thereafter, the Sentencing Commission passed additional 
retroactive guideline amendments, lowering base offense levels.47  
When the Sentencing Commission passes retroactive guideline amendments, 
those whose sentences are affected by the amendment may seek a sentence 
reduction.48 Title 18 United States Code § 3582(c)(2) does not provide for a full 
resentencing but allows the defendants sentenced to be reduced, substituting only the 
retroactive guideline amendment.49 At the time Amendment 750 went into effect, 
there were nearly thirty thousand federal inmates serving sentences for crack cocaine 
offenses, approximately fifteen percent of the entire federal prison population.50 
Most of these thirty thousand inmates believed the passage of Amendment 750 
would provide them with some relief.51 Unfortunately, only those defendants who 
were sentenced above their respective mandatory minimums were able to get any 
reduction.52  
III. ALL DEFENDANTS SERVING SENTENCES UNDER THE PRE-FSA MANDATORY 
MINIMUMS ARE DENIED RELIEF 
Remember Andre; serving mandatory life for possessing sixty grams of crack? If 
he were arrested in September of 2010 for the same offense, the FSA would have 
                                                           
 41 United States v. Hameed, 614 F.3d 259 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Johnson, 564 
F.3d 419 (6th Cir. 2009).  
 42 Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id.  
 46 Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 8, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). 
 47 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AMENDMENT 750 (effective Nov. 1, 2011). 
 48 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582(c)(2) (West 2002).  
 49 Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2690 (2010); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 1B1.10(b) (2004). 
 50 United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 485 (6th Cir. 2013).  
 51 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATEMENT OF JUDGE SARIS, supra note 34, at 9. 
 52 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PRELIMINARY CRACK RETROACTIVITY DATA REPORT tbl.9 (July 
2013) [hereinafter U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PRELIMINARY DATA], available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/FSA_Amendmen
t/2013-07_USSC_Prelim_Crack_Retro_Data_Report_FSA.pdf. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss3/7
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subjected him to a five-year mandatory minimum, and a ten-year mandatory 
minimum because of his prior drug felony.53 Thus, if the FSA is made retroactive, 
Andre would receive a mandatory ten years, not the mandatory life sentence he is 
currently serving.  
Unsurprisingly, after the passage of the FSA, numerous defendants who 
languished in prison under the, now deleted, pre-FSA statutory penalties sought 
relief.54 Waves of motions were filed challenging the validity of their sentences, 
arguing their pre-FSA mandatory minimum sentences were unconstitutional or 
improper.55 Each and every circuit court denied relief.56 All eleven circuit courts 
relied on the “general savings statute,”57 1 U.S.C. § 109, which states: 
The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish 
any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the 
repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated 
as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action 
or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. 
All circuits concluded that because the FSA does not contain any express 
statement of retroactivity, and without any express statement from Congress, the 
court refused to allow any retroactive effect.58 Thus, despite these drastic changes to 
the crack cocaine statutory penalties, defendants were unable to pierce their pre-FSA 
statutory mandatory minimums. In fact, a thorough review of the relevant cases has 
only revealed one case where the defendant was able to receive a sentence reduction 
below the pre-FSA mandatory minimums. In United States v. Miller,59 the defendant 
was twenty-seven years old when convicted in 1989 of a drug trafficking 
conspiracy60 and firearm offenses.61 He was found to be a career offender, which 
placed his sentencing guideline range at three hundred and sixty months to life; 
however, because of his multiple prior felony drug convictions, he was 
statutorily-mandated to receive a life sentence.62 The district court sentenced Miller 
to a life sentence, with a five-year consecutive sentence for the firearm offenses.63  
Three days after the passage of the FSA, the district court granted Miller a 
sentence reduction to two hundred and sixty-two months, allowing him to be 
immediately released. The district court recognized that Miller’s career offender 
                                                           
 53 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(B) (West 2010).  
 54 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PRELIMINARY DATA, supra note 52, at tbl.1. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See supra text accompanying note 11. 
 57 Because the case law also refers to the general savings statute as the general savings 
clause, the two terms will be used interchangeably.  
 58 See supra text accompanying note 11. 
 59 United States v. Miller, No. 4:89-CR-120, 2010 WL 3119768 (D. Minn. Aug. 6, 2010). 
 60 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (West 2010).  
 61 Miller, 2010 WL 3119768, at *1.  
 62 Id.; 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A) (West 2010).  
 63 Miller, 2010 WL 3119768, at *1.  
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status and statutorily mandated life sentence under the pre-FSA penalties prevented 
him from receiving a sentencing reduction.64 However the district court granted 
Miller a sentencing reduction anyway, recognizing, “[t]his case, however, represents 
a singular and unique exception.”65 
In support of its order, the district court referenced the FSA, by stating, “[at] the 
original sentence, [the Court] did not consider the crack/powder disparity—a 
disparity that Congress and the sentencing commission have repeatedly attempted to 
resolve.”66 The court noted that under the 2010 statutes and guidelines, Miller would 
not have received a life sentence, but would have been sentenced in the range of two 
hundred and ten to two hundred and sixty-two months.67 The district court also stated 
that Miller had served more than twenty years already, and that “[s]uch a sentence 
absolutely and adequately reflects the seriousness of the offense and provides just 
punishment. In addition, nothing in the record suggests defendant represents a 
danger to the community if released.”68 Thus, while the district court never used the 
term “retroactive,” the district court did in fact retroactively apply the FSA to 
Miller’s 1989 sentence. The government did not appeal Miller’s sentence 
reduction.69 
With all due respect to the Miller Court, while the district court hinged its 
decision on Miller being “a singular and unique exception,”70 there is nothing unique 
or singular about his case. There are thousands of defendants serving sentences just 
like Miller’s throughout the country.71 His receipt of a sentence reduction due to the 
retroactive application of the FSA stands alone. In the wake of the passage of the 
FSA, no other defendants have incurred the same benefit as Miller—the retroactive 
application of the FSA. Countless numbers of defendants were denied any relief and 
remain incarcerated, serving sentences based solely on the pre-FSA statutory 
penalties.72  
Just as the dust began to settle, and all circuit courts had ruled the FSA was not 
retroactive, a factual anomaly presented itself. The issue arose: What about 
defendants who pled guilty or were convicted prior to the passage of the FSA, but 
whose sentencing hearing occurred after the FSA went into effect? The defendants in 
these cases have been called “pipeline” or “straddle” cases.73 A circuit split arose on 
                                                           
 64 Id.  
 65 Id.  
 66 Id. at *2.  
 67 Id.  
 68 Id.  
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at *1.  
 71 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATEMENT OF JUDGE SARIS, supra note 34, at 9-10. 
 72 Id. at 10 (If the FSA were retroactive, 8,829 inmates would be eligible for a reduction, 
with an average reduction of 53 months per inmate. Also, 87.7% of those are eligible are 
African-American.). 
 73 United States v. McNair, No. 10-5901, 2012 WL 987753 (6th Cir. Mar. 23, 2012); 
United States v. Gillam, 753 F. Supp. 2d 683 (W.D. Mich. 2010). 
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how to handle these pipeline cases. The First Circuit in United States v. Douglas,74 
found the FSA could apply to these pipeline defendants. The First Circuit expressed 
its awareness of the general savings statute, and the presumption against 
retroactivity, but found, “the savings statute [1 U.S.C. § 109] may be overridden 
‘either by express declaration or necessary implication.’”75 The First Circuit ordered 
retroactive application of the FSA because it was a “fair result.”76 Thus, the First 
Circuit found the FSA could be retroactively applied to pipeline defendants because 
such a result was only fair, thereby overcoming the presumption against 
retroactivity.  
The Third Circuit issued a similar holding in United States v. Dixon.77 The Third 
Circuit also found the FSA to apply to pipeline defendants as, “[t]he language of the 
Act reveals Congress’s intent that courts no longer be forced to impose mandatory 
minimums sentences that are both indefensible and discriminatory.”78 The Dixon 
Court refused to follow the presumption against retroactivity, finding, “the Saving 
Statute cannot control when preserving repealed penalties would plainly conflict 
with the intent of Congress as expressed in a subsequent statute.”79 The Court was 
also guided by the overarching principle of fairness, stating their holding, “comports 
with its stated purpose to restore fairness to federal cocaine sentencing.”80 
The Eleventh Circuit also allowed retroactive application of the FSA to pipeline 
defendants in United States v. Rojas,81 but the Court en banc later vacated the 
holding.82 
The Seventh Circuit went against Douglas and Dixon, holding the FSA could not 
be retroactively applied to pipeline defendants.83 The Court began its opinion stating 
the FSA should be more aptly named “The Not Quite as Fair as it could be 
Sentencing Act of 2010.”84 The Court, however, refused to “read in by implication 
anything not obvious in the text of the FSA. We believe that if Congress wanted the 
FSA or the guideline amendments to apply to not-yet-sentenced defendants 
convicted on pre-FSA conduct, it would have at least dropped a hint to that effect 
somewhere in the text of the FSA.”85 Thus, relying solely on the text of the FSA, the 
Court denied any retroactive effect to pipeline defendants.  
                                                           
 74 United States v. Douglas, 644 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 75 Id. at 43 (quoting Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 465 (1908)). 
 76 Id. at 44 (citing United States v. Goncalves, 642 F.3d 245, 244-45 (1st Cir. 2011)).  
 77 United States v. Dixon, 648 F.3d 195, 199 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 78 Id. at 196. 
 79 Id. at 199. 
 80 Id. at 203. 
 81 United States v. Rojas, 645 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 82 United States v. Hudson, 659 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2011).  
 83 United States v. Fisher, 635 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 84 Id. at 338. 
 85 Id. at 339-40. 
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Given this split among the circuits, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certorari 
in United States v. Dorsey,86 to determine whether the FSA could be retroactively 
applied to pipeline defendants.  
IV. THE SUPREME COURT GRANTS RETROACTIVE RELIEF TO PIPELINE DEFENDANTS 
In Dorsey, the Supreme Court held the mandatory minimums statutory penalties 
in the FSA apply to defendants sentenced after the FSA’s enactment, regardless of 
when they committed the offense.87 The Court set forth six considerations, which all 
taken together, supported its holding.88  
First, the Court held the saving statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, does not require an 
“express statement” for a criminal statute to apply retroactively, as long as the “plain 
import” or “fair implication” of the statute so provides.89 The Court acknowledged 
the savings statute purported to require that subsequent Congresses expressly state 
whether ameliorative criminal statutes would apply to offenses that occurred prior to 
the enactment of the statute, but noted that “statutes enacted by one Congress cannot 
bind a later Congress.”90 Thus, the Court held the saving statute is not a bar to 
applicability, as long as courts “assure themselves that ordinary interpretive 
considerations point clearly in that direction.”91 
Second, the Court observed that the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) sets forth a 
different background sentencing principle that defendants generally do get the 
benefit of ameliorative sentencing amendments.92 It noted that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii), courts must apply the Guidelines that are in effect on the date of 
the initial sentencing.93 Thus, “when the Commission adopts new, lower Guideline 
amendments, those amendments become effective to offenders who committed an 
offense prior to the adoption of the new amendments but are sentenced 
thereafter.”94The Court “assume[d] that Congress was aware of this different 
background sentencing principle,” and interpreted the FSA to be consistent with 
such principles.95 
Third, the Court explained the language in the FSA implies that Congress 
intended to follow the SRA’s background principle allowing for defendants to 
benefit from ameliorative sentencing amendments.96 In the FSA, Congress required 
the Sentencing Commission to promulgate “as soon as practicable” (not later than 
                                                           
 86 Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012). 
 87 Id. at 2335. 
 88 Id. at 2331. 
 89 Id. at 2332. 
 90 Id. at 2331.  
 91 Id. at 2332.  
 92 Id. at 2331.  
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 2332. 
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ninety days after August 3, 2010), sentencing guidelines amendments in order to 
“achieve consistency with other guideline provisions and applicable law.”97 
Fourth, the Court observed that by denying relief to defendants like Dorsey, 
thereby applying the pre-FSA mandatory minimums to post-FSA sentencings, this 
result would create “disparities of a kind that Congress enacted the [SRA] and the 
[FSA] to prevent.”98 Two individuals who were sentenced at the same time, at the 
same place, and even by the same judge would receive substantially different 
sentences based only on the date of their conduct.99 In addition, applying pre-FSA 
mandatory minimums at post-FSA sentencings would require courts to impose 
pre-Act sentences after “Congress had specifically found such a sentence was 
unfairly long.”100 
Fifth, if the FSA were not applied, instead of restoring fairness to federal cocaine 
sentencing, the result would make sentences even more disproportionate.101 “It 
would create new anomalies—new sets of disproportionate sentences—not 
previously present. This is because sentencing courts would be required to apply the 
[post-FSA] sentencing guidelines in conjunction with the [pre-FSA] mandatory 
minimums . . . This would result in a sentencing ‘cliff’ wherever a defendant was 
subject to a [pre-FSA] mandatory minimum.”102 Such a sentencing scheme would 
also result in sentencing valleys where defendants with substantially different 
conduct would be subject to the same sentence.103  
Sixth, the Court explained there were no strong countervailing considerations 
against its holding.104 Taking these six considerations together, the Court concluded 
that Congress intended the FSA’s more lenient mandatory minimums to apply to 
post-FSA sentencing of pre-FSA offenders.105 
In total, the Dorsey Court found the savings statute did not bar relief to pipeline 
defendants because the FSA’s “language, structure, and basic objectives,” including 
the “plain import” or “fair implication” intended the new mandatory minimums to 
apply.106 The Court rested its conclusion “primarily upon the fact that a contrary 
determination would seriously undermine basic Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
objectives such as uniformity and proportionality in sentencing. . . . [A] contrary 
determination would (in respect to relevant groups of drug offenders) produce 
sentences less uniform and more disproportionate than if Congress had not enacted 
                                                           
 97 Id. (quoting Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 8(2), 124 Stat. 2372, 
2374 (2010)). 
 98 Id. at 2333.  
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 2334. 
 102 Id.  
 103 Id. at 2337-38. 
 104 Id. at 2335.  
 105 Id. 
 106 Id.  
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the Fair Sentencing Act at all.”107 The Court also recognized that application of the 
new mandatory minimums to pre-FSA offenders sentenced after the FSA’s effective 
date would create a new set of disparities, which would contravene the goals of 
federal sentencing.108 
V. DORSEY BROKE NEW GROUND THEREBY ALLOWING DEFENDANTS TO RECEIVE 
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE FSA 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Dorsey made clear that defendants whose 
offense pre-dated the FSA, but had not yet been sentenced, could receive retroactive 
application of the FSA. Consistent with the Court’s holding in Dorsey, all defendants 
sentenced before August 3, 2010, should also receive the application of the FSA’s 
new mandatory minimum statutory penalties. The Court’s rationale in Dorsey and 
the Court’s six considerations, apply with equal force to defendants sentenced prior 
to the passage of the FSA. Applying these same six considerations (for the sake of 
brevity, they have been condensed to five) from Dorsey to those sentenced prior to 
the FSA, requires retroactive application of the FSA. 
First, Dorsey makes clear there is no “express statement” of retroactivity found in 
the FSA.109 This does not prevent retroactivity, but instead allowed the Dorsey Court 
to look at the “plain import” and “fair implication” of the FSA.110 In doing so, the 
Supreme Court concluded that by enacting the FSA, “Congress intended the [Act’s] 
new, lower mandatory minimums to apply to the post-Act sentencing of pre-Act 
offenders.”111 Thus, even though the legislation made no mention of retroactivity, 
either for or against it, the Court was able to infer retroactivity to pipeline defendants 
by looking at the FSA’s fair implication. In doing so, the Court relied on FSA’s 
express purpose, which was to “restore fairness to Federal cocaine sentencing.”112 
Because there cannot be limited, or partial, retroactivity of a statute,113 if pipeline 
defendants can receive retroactive application of the FSA, then those sentenced prior 
to the FSA’s passage must receive retroactive application as well. If courts are to be 
true to the Supreme Court’s holding in Dorsey, then the “plain import” and “fair 
implication” of the FSA is application to all defendants who are serving sentences 
for crack cocaine offenses. This is the only plausible and rational way to follow 
Congress’s will—to restore fairness in crack cocaine sentencing.  
Second, the Dorsey Court found that a “background principle” of federal 
sentencing supported retroactive application of the FSA.114 In Dorsey, the Court was 
not faced with sentence reduction motions,115 collateral attacks or post-conviction 
                                                           
 107 Id. at 2326. 
 108 Id. at 2335.  
 109 Id. at 2331. 
 110 Id. at 2335. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, pmbl., 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010). 
 113 United States v. Holcomb, 657 F.3d 445, 446 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 114 Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2332. 
 115 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582(c)(2) (West 2002). 
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challenges116 to a defendant’s sentence, but the issue was under which statutory 
penalties pipeline defendants should be subject to at their initial sentencing.117 The 
provision considered in Dorsey—18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii)—provides for 
retroactive application of the sentencing Guidelines not expressly, but through a 
general command the sentencing court apply the Guidelines “in effect at the time of 
sentencing.”118 In some cases, this principle leads to the retroactive application of the 
Guidelines to conduct that pre-dated the new law.119 In post-sentencing proceedings, 
most specifically sentence reduction motions, however, there is a different statute at 
issue—18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) —which in contrast to § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii), expressly 
provides retroactive sentencing amendments. Thus, the retroactive application of the 
FSA is not merely a “background principle” in these statutory provisions as it was in 
Dorsey, but is plainly in the foreground. 
Third, Dorsey relied heavily on the need for consistency between the sentencing 
guidelines and the FSA, and such need supports retroactivity. The Court stated the 
FSA expressly directed there be “consistency” between the guidelines and 
“applicable law,” including the FSA’s statutory amendments.120 This directive was 
so important that Congress granted “emergency authority” to the Sentencing 
Commission and directed them to enact retroactive sentencing guidelines 
amendments reflecting the statutory changes in the FSA.121 The “fair implication” of 
this command for consistency is that Congress wanted the new sentencing guidelines 
to comport with the new statute and vice versa. This consideration was also detailed 
by the First Circuit in Douglas, in which the Court stated, “[i]t seems unrealistic to 
suppose that Congress strongly desired to put the [new] guidelines in effect by 
November 1 even for crimes committed before the FSA but balked at giving the 
same defendants the benefit of the newly enacted eighteen to one mandatory 
minimums.”122 It is irrational to assume that Congress gave the Sentencing 
Commission discretion to make the new sentencing guidelines retroactive, but did 
not want the same for the FSA’s mandatory minimums, with which the new 
sentencing guidelines were to be consistent. Congress’s strong desire for 
consistency, and its directive to the Sentencing Commission, fairly implies that the 
statute was to go wherever the guidelines went. 
Fourth, as in Dorsey, continuing to apply the pre-FSA mandatory minimums to 
sentence reduction motions, and denying retroactivity would create the same kind of 
disparity Congress enacted the SRA and the FSA to prevent. Both the SRA and the 
FSA were enacted to prevent disparities in sentencing; in fact, the FSA’s express 
purpose was to restore fairness.123 Denying retroactivity of the FSA would not only 
                                                           
 116 Such as a habeas corpus motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006). 
 117 Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2330. 
 118 Id. at 2332. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. (quoting Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 8(2), 124 Stat. 2372, 
2374 (2010)). 
 121 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 8, 124 Stat. 2372, 2374 (2010). 
 122 United States v. Douglas, 644 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 123 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(6) (West 2010); Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
220, pmbl., 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010)). 
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fail to achieve consistency, but would create greater inconsistency in federal 
sentencing. Consider this hypothetical: Bruce is arrested on July 1, 2010, he 
immediately pleads guilty and is sentenced on August 1, 2010. Because Bruce had 
fifty-five grams of crack cocaine, he is subject to the mandatory minimum of ten 
years, and because he had two prior drug felonies, Bruce is sentenced to mandatory 
life in prison.124 Now, consider Lou, who is arrested on the same day, with the same 
amount of crack, and also has two prior drug felonies. Lou initially wanted to go to 
trial, and delayed resolution of his case for six weeks. Then, on August 15, 2010, 
Lou pleads guilty and is sentenced. Because his conviction and sentencing occurred 
after the FSA, however, he will only be subject to the five-year mandatory 
minimum, and with his prior convictions, Lou will be subject to the ten-year 
mandatory minimum.125 Thus, two identical defendants could receive extremely 
disparate sentences. This disparity between the sentences of Bruce and Lou is 
precisely the sort of disparity that Congress enacted the FSA to prevent; the 
elimination of such a disparity was central to the rationale underlying Dorsey.  
A similar point was detailed by Chief Judge Easterbrook in his decision to deny 
rehearing en banc in United States v. Holcomb.126 Chief Judge Easterbrook noted 
that Attorney General Holder issued a Memorandum to all federal prosecutors on 
July 15, 2011, which directed them to take the position that the FSA applied to all 
cases in which a sentence was imposed on or after August 3, 2010.127 As Chief Judge 
Easterbrook explained, “the Attorney General has concluded that the 2010 Act is 
partially retroactive.”128 He further explained that “the Supreme Court has never held 
any change in a criminal penalty to be partially retroactive.129 The choice has always 
been binary: retroactive or prospective.”130 “If the FSA is retroactive, then it applies 
to all pending cases no matter how far they have got in the judicial system; if it is not 
retroactive, then it applies only to crimes committed on or after August 3, 2010. 
Nothing depends on the sentencing date, which reflects how long it took to catch a 
criminal, and the state of the district judge’s calendar, rather than principles of 
deterrence or desert.”131 Chief Judge Easterbrook observed that selecting an effective 
date for new legislation can be arbitrary and, he explained the unfairness of partial 
retroactivity as follows: 
[W]hat’s fair about condemning someone sentenced on August 2 to more 
time in prison than a person sentenced the next day, even though they 
committed their crimes on the same date (and may have been 
coconspirators)? Suppose comrades in crime distribute cocaine in mid-
2009 and are caught promptly. One confesses, pleads guilty, and testifies 
                                                           
 124 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (b)(1)(A)(viii) (West 2010). 
 125 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (b)(1)(B)(viii) (West 2010). 
 126 United States v. Holcomb, 657 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 127 Id. at 445. 
 128 Id.  
 129 Id. at 446. 
 130 Id.  
 131 Id. at 446-47. 
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at the trial of the other, who fights tooth and nail and falsely denies 
culpability. The first is sentenced on August 1, 2010, the second on 
September 1. How would it be “fair” (or even conscionable) to give the 
lower sentence to the person who refused to accept responsibility for his 
crimes, just because by dragging out the process that person was 
sentenced after August 2?132 
Fifth, the Court in Dorsey, found no sufficiently strong countervailing 
considerations to deny retroactive relief to the pipeline defendants.133 Similarly, there 
are no such considerations here. An argument against retroactivity would be 
preserving the finality of judgments. Courts are reluctant to re-open cases which 
have been finalized for years.134 The law, however, provides defendants with a 
statutory remedy to reduce their sentences, if, and only if, their sentencing guidelines 
have changed.135 This narrow, but defined remedy, is available to defendants, and 
has been provided by Congress. Thus Congress, in passing § 3582(c)(2), has held 
that preserving the finality of judgments should not be the overriding concern. In 
fact, the Supreme Court has noted that sentence reduction motions, § 3582(c)(2), 
“represent[] a congressional act of lenity intended to give prisoners the benefit of 
later enacted adjustments to the judgments reflected in the Guidelines.”136 
Thus, all the reasons the Supreme Court relied upon in Dorsey, and allowing 
retroactive application of the FSA to pipeline defendants, also equally apply to those 
currently serving sentences under the pre-FSA crack cocaine mandatory minimums.  
There is one additional principle of statutory construction in support of 
retroactivity, which was not addressed by the Dorsey Court. Before passing the FSA, 
Congress was faced with a prior version of the FSA, which included a clause 
expressly providing that “[t]here shall be no retroactive application of any portion of 
this Act.”137 The final version of the bill, which actually passed, did not include said 
provision. Because this provision against retroactivity was not included in the final 
version of the bill, it may be presumed that Congress did not intend to preclude 
retroactivity of the FSA. “Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier 
version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the 
limitation was not intended.”138 The deletion of limiting language is exactly what 
                                                           
 132 Id. at 451-52. 
 133 Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2335 (2012).  
 134 Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2692 (2010).  
 135 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582 (c)(2) (West 2002). 
 136 Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2692. 
 137 H.R. 265, 111th Cong. § 11 (2009). 
 138 Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 603 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Russello v. 
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983)); see also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris 
Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1993) (quoting Russello, applying it to rejection of 
Senate draft of bill, and stating “[w]e are directed by those words [in the final bill], and not by 
the discarded draft”); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 
442-43 (1987) (noting enactment of House bill rather than Senate bill and stating that “[f]ew 
principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress 
does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of 
other language”). 
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happened here; the earlier version of the bill expressly and broadly barred any 
retroactive application and the final version of the bill contained no limitation at all. 
Just as was seen before Dorsey, the major hurdle to full retroactivity is the 
savings statute. While the Dorsey Court felt the saving statute did not alter their 
holding,139 the clause has nonetheless been the critical factor in lower courts denying 
retroactivity, even post-Dorsey.140 Thus, any defendant seeking retroactivity must 
still convince the court the general savings statute does not apply.  
The general savings statute was enacted in 1871 in order to “abolish the 
common-law presumption that the repeal of a criminal statute resulted in the 
abatement of ‘all prosecutions which had not reached final disposition in the highest 
court authorized to review them.’”141 Such abatements were “often the product of 
legislative inadvertence.”142 The saving statute cannot be viewed narrowly, but its 
context must be considered in light of the statutes at issue. As the Supreme Court 
held in Hertz v. Woodman,143 the saving statute is “to be read and construed as a part 
of all subsequent repealing statutes, in order to give effect to the will and intent of 
Congress.”144 
In Bradley v. United States,145 the Supreme Court considered whether defendants 
convicted of drug offenses committed prior to the effective date of the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 could benefit from 
that Act, or whether they were required to be sentenced according to the law in force 
at the time of the offenses even though their sentences were imposed after it. 
Following the savings statute, the Supreme Court noted that “[a]t common law, the 
repeal of a criminal statute abated all prosecutions that had not reached final 
disposition in the highest court authorized to review them.”146 The rule applied even 
when the statute was not repealed, but the penalty reduced.147 “To avoid such results, 
legislatures frequently indicated an intention not to abate pending prosecutions by 
including in the repealing statute a specific clause stating that prosecutions of 
offenses under the repealed statute were not to be abated.”148 In Bradley, the Court 
considered such a saving clause that was included in the statute at issue and it held 
                                                           
 139 Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2331 (2012).  
 140 United States v. Hippolyte, 712 F.3d 535, 542 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Finley, 
487 F. App’x. 260, 264-65 (6th Cir. 2012).  
 141 Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 660 (1974) (quoting Bradley 
v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 606-07 (1973)). 
 142 Marrero, 417 U.S. at 660; Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1964). 
 143 Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 217 (1910). 
 144 See also United States v. Dixon, 648 F.3d 195, 199 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Saving Statute 
cannot justify a disregard of the will of Congress as manifested, either expressly or by 
necessary implication, in a subsequent enactment.”); United States v. Douglas, 644 F.3d 39, 
43 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[T]he savings statute may be overridden either by express declaration or 
necessary implication.”). 
 145 Bradley, 410 U.S. at 606. 
 146 Id. at 607. 
 147 Id. at 608.  
 148 Id. 
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that “prosecution” in that context meant “prosecution” as it was understood in its 
legal sense.149 Thus, the district court in Bradley properly rejected the defendant’s 
argument that the statute’s ameliorative provisions should have been applied to them 
because they were sentenced after it went into effect.150 
Bradley’s reliance on the savings clause should not control in determining the 
retroactivity of the FSA. Retroactively applying the FSA, either through a sentence 
reduction motion or a collateral attack, does not concern a pending prosecution and 
thus unlike Bradley, the general saving statute does not apply. Indeed, since a § 
3582(c)(2) sentence reduction motion has a “limited scope and purpose,”151 it “does 
not authorize a resentencing,” and is “within the narrow bounds established by the 
[Sentencing] Commission.”152 Moreover, unlike the statute at issue in Bradley, the 
FSA does not contain a specific saving clause, and in fact the FSA does not 
expressly address retroactivity at all.  
In looking at the congressional intent to determine the retroactivity of the FSA, a 
broader interpretation of the savings statute is necessary.153 Such a broader view of 
the savings statute is essential because “the Saving Statute cannot control when 
preserving repealed penalties would plainly conflict with the intent of Congress as 
expressed in a subsequent statute.”154 Even with statutory language that is “clearly 
delineated,” exceptions may be implied “where essential to prevent ‘absurd results’ 
or consequences obviously at a variance with the policy of the enactment as a 
whole.”155 Accordingly, the savings clause should not to be applied in circumstances 
that lead to an absurd result.  
To prevent defendants sentenced under the now-repealed mandatory minimum 
sentencing penalties to attain retroactive relief of the FSA would yield absurd results. 
To require defendants to continue to languish under discriminatory and unfair 
sentencing provisions, would seriously undermine Congress’s intent in passing the 
FSA. Congress could not have been clearer in their purpose for passing the FSA, 
which was to “restore fairness in federal cocaine sentencing.”156 Congress’s 
secondary purpose was to achieve consistency.157 Neither fairness nor consistency 
can be achieved if countless defendants remain incarcerated under the pre-FSA 
statutory mandatory minimums. To effectuate the FSA’s objectives, the statute’s 
retroactivity cannot stop with pipeline defendants, but must apply to all defendants 
who are incarcerated for crack offenses.  
                                                           
 149 Id. at 609. 
 150 Id. at 609-10. 
 151 Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2692 (2010). 
 152 Id. at 2694. 
 153 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). 
 154 United States v. Dixon, 648 F.3d 195, 199 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 155 United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552 (1979); see also Bailey v. Lawrence, 
972 F.2d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1992); Sosa v. Jones, 389 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(recognizing that it is “a traditional and appropriate function of the courts” to “construe 
statutes so as to avoid absurd results”). 
 156 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, pmbl., 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010)). 
 157 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 8, 124 Stat. 2372, 2374 (2010); 
Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2012). 
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Additionally, viewing the totality of events that led up to the FSA is an important 
consideration in determining retroactivity. With the goal of “restoring fairness,” the 
FSA is remedial in nature and is clearly intended to provide relief from what is now 
recognized as an unduly harsh and unjustified punishment. Principles of statutory 
construction support the retroactivity of the FSA because remedial legislation should 
be construed liberally.158 While the FSA deals with penalty provisions, which are not 
traditionally viewed as remedial legislation, the FSA was unquestionably intended to 
remedy what has come to be viewed as unfair and unduly harsh sentencing. 
Thus, principles of statutory construction, a fair reading of the FSA, and applying 
the rationale of the Supreme Court’s holding in Dorsey all point to the complete 
retroactivity of the FSA. Defendants who are currently serving sentences under the 
pre-FSA mandatory minimums should seek a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(2) as well as challenge the constitutionality of their sentence by a collateral 
attack, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  
VI. HOW THOSE WHO CONTINUE TO LANGUISH IN PRISON UNDER THE PRE-FSA 
PENALTIES SEEK RETROACTIVE RELIEF 
This Author suggests there are two viable ways in which a defendant could 
challenge the constitutionality of their sentence: (1) that failure to retroactively apply 
the FSA violates the Equal Protection Clause and (2) failure to retroactively apply 
the FSA constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Each will be dealt with 
individually. 
A. Equal Protection of the Laws Requires Retroactive Application of the FSA 
Since Dorsey has been issued, only one court has granted relief to inmates 
seeking retroactive application of the FSA. On May 17, 2013, the Sixth Circuit 
issued United States v. Blewett.159 In Blewett, the two defendants appealed the denial 
of their sentence reduction motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).160 The Sixth 
Circuit reversed and remanded, finding “the federal judicial perpetuation of the 
racially discriminatory mandatory minimum crack sentences for those defendants 
sentenced under the old crack sentencing law, as the government advocates, would 
violate the Equal Protection Clause, as incorporated into the Fifth Amendment by 
the doctrine of Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).”161 The Sixth Circuit also 
held the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dorsey confirmed that “Congress . . . intended 
the Fair Sentencing Act to repeal and redress the wrongs of the older crack statute 
that Congress believed had proven itself to be arbitrary, irrational, and racially 
discriminatory. The status quo has now been overturned.”162 
The Court went on to say: 
                                                           
 158 See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 263 n.16 (“[R]emedial statutes are to be liberally construed 
and if a retroactive interpretation will promote the ends of justice, they should receive such 
construction.”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 561 n.1 (1999); Clark v. Capital Credit & 
Collection Servs., 460 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010); Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 780, 781 (6th 
Cir. 1996).  
 159 United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2013).  
 160 Id. at 485. 
 161 Id. at 484. 
 162 Id. at 486 (emphasis added). 
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The remedy is straightforward and relatively simple. The Fair Sentencing 
Act and the new retroactive Sentencing Guidelines subsequently adopted 
by the Sentencing Commission can and should be interpreted to replace 
retroactively the old, discriminatory mandatory minimums with the new, 
more lenient minimums. It is our duty under the constitutional-doubt 
canon of statutory construction. The Equal Protection Clause requires us 
to alter what Senator Leahy called >one of the most notorious symbols of 
racial discrimination in the modern criminal justice system= and an 
>imbalance that . . . disparages the Constitution’s promise of equal 
treatment for all Americans.= In light of our new knowledge about the 
racial discrimination inherent in the old law, inertia and judicial instinct to 
avoid change and maintain the status quo should no longer protect the old 
sentences.163 
The Blewett Court recognized it faced a dire situation: “thousands of inmates, 
most black, languish in prison under the old, discredited [crack vs. powder] ratio.”164 
In examining the Fair Sentencing Act, the Court “regard[ed] as the most important 
consideration the clear congressional purpose to end the long, racially discriminatory 
sentences imposed in crack cocaine cases over the past twenty-five years.”165 The 
Court stated: 
In light of our new knowledge about the racial discrimination inherent in 
the old law, inertia and judicial instinct to avoid change and maintain the 
status quo should no longer protect the old sentences. We should not 
allow the government’s legalisms to undermine the purpose of the Fair 
Sentencing Act and its more lenient punishment system for crack 
cocaine.166 
In summary, the Court held, “The [Fair Sentencing Act of 2010] should apply to 
all defendants, including those sentenced prior to its passage. We therefore reverse 
the judgment of the district court and remand for resentencing.”167  
Less than two months after the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Blewett, the Court 
granted en banc review.168 The effect of granting en banc review vacates the panel’s 
opinion in Blewett.169 The case was argued before the entire Sixth Circuit en banc on 
October 9th. Despite the uncertainty of Blewett’s future in the Sixth Circuit, as well 
as potentially the Supreme Court, the analysis of the Blewett panel regarding Equal 
Protection is sound and should be followed.  
                                                           
 163 Id. at 490 (citations omitted). 
 164 Id. at 484. 
 165 Id. at 486. 
 166 Id. at 490. 
 167 Id. at 484. 
 168 Blewett, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15872 (6th Cir. July 11, 2013). 
 169 See 6TH CIR. R. 35(b) (“A decision to grant rehearing en banc vacates the previous 
opinion and judgment of the court, stays the mandate, and restores the case on the docket as a 
pending appeal.”).  
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The discriminatory impact of the racially-biased crack cocaine sentencing 
scheme, by itself, is not an Equal Protection violation. However, the passage of the 
FSA, coupled with the congressional intent for passage of the FSA, illustrates that 
maintaining the pre-FSA sentences for those incarcerated amounts to an Equal 
Protection violation. Thus, failing to retroactively apply the FSA violates the Equal 
Protection Clause.  
The federal crack cocaine sentences have been extremely disproportionately 
applied to African-Americans. [Insert footnore “supra notes 35-37”] Courts, 
however, have rejected Equal Protection challenges, even when confronted with 
daunting and harsh statistics detailing that African-Americans are prosecuted for 
crack over ten times as often as whites.170 While statistics demonstrating the 
discriminatory impact alone are unable to provide constitutional relief for those 
serving pre-FSA penalties, the passage of the FSA is an intervening event, which has 
a dramatic effect on the Equal Protection analysis. The statements from 
Congressional members who supported and passed the FSA is substantial evidence 
of the discriminatory impact as well as the irrationality of the pre-FSA penalties. 
Looking at the totality of the statistics of disparate impact and the words from the 
legislature, maintaining these discriminatory pre-FSA sentences constitutes an Equal 
Protection violation.  
The Supreme Court has held that a statute, which is race-neutral on its face, but is 
applied in a way that it invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, may amount to 
an Equal Protection violation.171 In fact, the racial impact of a law, rather than a 
discriminatory purpose, is a critical factor.172 “Statistics showing racial or ethnic 
imbalance are probative . . . [because and] only because such imbalance is often a 
telltale sign of purposeful discrimination.”173 The Eighth Circuit has held, 
“Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the 
totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the challenged 
conduct bears more heavily upon one race than another.”174 The circuits have held 
that when the “natural, probable, and foreseeable result” of a state action is racially 
motivated, a presumption of discriminatory intent can occur.175  
                                                           
 170 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 19 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Washington, 127 F.3d 510, 519 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Dumas, 64 F.3d 1427, 1429 
(9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Galloway, 951 F.2d 64, 65 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Lattimore, 974 F.2d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 171 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 
356 (1886)). 
 172 Washington, 426 U.S. at 243 (citing Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 
(1972)); see also id. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Frequently the most probative evidence 
of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing 
the subjective state of mind of the actor.”).  
 173 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977); see also Black 
Shield Police Ass’n v. Cleveland, No. C85-1954, 1986 WL 532 at *6 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 5, 
1986) (“An inference of discriminatory purpose may arise from the historical background or 
from statistics showing the disparate impact.”). 
 174 Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex v. Greenholtz, 567 F.2d 1368, 1375 (8th Cir. 
1977) (citing Washington, 426 U.S. at 242). 
 175 NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Ed., 559 F.2d 1042, 1046-47 (6th Cir. 1977); United States 
v. Sch. Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 535-36 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 433 
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Thus, the statistics are probative, but not the sole touchstone, in determining 
whether the disproportionate application of the crack laws constitutes an Equal 
Protection violation.176 Regarding these statistics, the Sentencing Commission 
reported that in 2011, eighty-three percent of federal crack cocaine defendants were 
African-American.177 Additionally, from 1988 to 1995, federal prosecutors 
prosecuted no whites under the crack provisions in seventeen states, including major 
cities such as: Boston, Denver, Chicago, Miami, Dallas, and Los Angeles.178 Thus, 
the pre-FSA sentencing statute has been disparately applied and has resulted in a 
significantly high proportion of African-Americans being sentenced. The Second 
Circuit even noted in 2011 the “retroactive [Guidelines] amendments exist to allow 
inequities to be fixed and the now-infamous 100-to-1 ratio was the source of 
shameful inequalities.”179  
To buttress these statistics, members of Congress who supported the passage of 
the FSA have recognized the discriminatory impact of the pre-FSA sentencing 
scheme. On October 15, 2009, Senator Dick Durbin stated: “It is important to note 
that the crack/powder disparity disproportionately affects African Americans. . . 
There is widespread and growing agreement that the Federal cocaine and sentencing 
policy in the United States today is unjustified and unjust.”180 Senator Leahy stated, 
“These disproportionate punishments have had a disparate impact on minority 
communities. This is unjust and runs contrary to our fundamental principles of equal 
justice under law . . . The racial imbalance that has resulted from the cocaine 
sentencing disparity disparages the Constitution’s promise of equal treatment for all 
Americans.”181 Representative Lee stated, “This disparity made no sense when it was 
initially enacted, and makes absolutely no sense today. . . . The unwarranted 
sentencing disparity not only overstates the relative harmfulness of the two forms of 
the drug and diverts federal resources from high-level drug traffickers, but it also 
disproportionately affects the African-American community.”182 Finally, 
Representative Lundgren declared:  
We initially came out of committee with a 20-to-1 ratio. By the time we 
finished on the floor, it was 100-to-1. We didn’t really have an 
evidentiary basis for it, but that’s what we did, thinking we were doing the 
right thing at the time. Certainly, one of the sad ironies in this entire 
episode is that a bill which was characterized by some as a response to the 
crack epidemic in African American communities has led to racial 
                                                           
U.S. 667 (1977) (per curiam); Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Ed., 512 F.2d 37, 50-51 (2d Cir. 
1975); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 588-89 (1st Cir. 1974). 
 176 Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.  
 177 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 35, at tbl.34. 
 178 Weikel, supra note 36; United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 179 United States v. Rivera, 662 F.3d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 180 155 CONG. REC. S10491 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 2009). 
 181 156 CONG. REC. S1682-83 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2010). 
 182 156 CONG. REC. H6199 (daily ed. July 28, 2010). 
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sentencing disparities which simply cannot be ignored in any reasoned 
discussion of this issue.183 
These members of Congress, along with the President, ushered the FSA into law. 
As evidenced from the Congressional members quoted above, the FSA represented a 
systematic shift to get rid of the discriminatory impact of the crack cocaine 
sentencing scheme. Such intent from Congress, coupled with the statistics 
demonstrating the discriminatory impact, is a powerful combination. While the FSA 
meant to put such discriminatory impact behind us, those who remain in prison, and 
fail to receive retroactive benefit of the FSA, are still victims of this discrimination. 
For those inmates to remain in prison under these now-eroded discriminatory 
sentences, perpetuates the discrimination. By maintaining such discrimination, and 
failing to retroactively apply the FSA, the Equal Protection rights are being violated 
for those who remain in prison under the pre-FSA sentences.184  
Furthermore, to apply the FSA to defendants like Dorsey, whose crimes preceded 
August 3, 2010, but not to those who were sentenced before August 3, 2010, is an 
irrational and arbitrary place for courts to draw the line. Such an arbitrary and unjust 
distinction also violates the Equal Protection Clause.185  
B. Failure to Retroactively Apply the FSA Constitutes Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment 
Failure to retroactively apply the FSA also violates a defendant’s Eighth 
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. A slew of Supreme Court 
cases, from the 1950s through the present, have held a defendant’s sentence violates 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment if it is 
contrary to the “national consensus and evolving standards of decency.” The 
statutory changes in the FSA, changes to the federal sentencing guidelines, as well as 
state sentencing reforms regarding crack cocaine, represent a systematic and 
widespread shift how crack cocaine offenders should be sentenced as compared to 
powder cocaine offenders. Taken together, the reforms in sentencing represent an 
evolution in the standards of decency. Thus, any defendant still subject to pre-FSA 
penalties is serving a cruel and unusual punishment.  
For generations, the Supreme Court has been guided by the “national consensus” 
and “evolving standards of decency” in deciding whether a sentencing scheme 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. In Trop v. Dulles,186 the Supreme Court 
declared a sentence unconstitutional because it offended our nation’s “standards of 
decency.” In Trop, the petitioner was convicted by military court of desertion during 
wartime and sentenced to loss of American citizenship.187 Trop filed for declaratory 
                                                           
 183 156 CONG. REC. H6202 (daily ed. July 28, 2010).  
 184 Cf. Clarke v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-1-92-278, 1993 WL 761489 at *20 (S.D. Ohio 
July 8, 1993), aff’d, 40 F.3d 807 (6th Cir. 1994) (in a case finding the local electoral system 
violated the Equal Protection Clause, held that even though the state action was not adopted 
with a discriminatory intent, maintaining such a system was still unconstitutional). 
 185 Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 464-65 (1991); Jones v. United States, 463 
U.S. 354, 362 n.10 (1983).  
 186 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 187 Id. at 88. 
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judgment claiming to be a citizen.188 The Supreme Court held the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment “forbids Congress to 
punish by taking away citizenship,” and struck down Trop’s sentence.189 The Court 
declared: 
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than 
the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the 
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits 
of civilized standards. Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be 
imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any technique 
outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally 
suspect.190 
“The Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. . . . This punishment is 
offensive to the cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands.”191 
The Court, looking to other nations, stated that denationalization is highly 
disfavored.192 “The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that 
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime . . . The United Nations’ 
survey of the nationality laws of eighty-four nations of the world reveals that only 
two countries . . . impose denationalization as a penalty for desertion. In this country 
the Eighth Amendment forbids that to be done.”193 Therefore, the Supreme Court set 
a precedent of looking at “standards of decency” in evaluating whether a punishment 
violates the Eighth Amendment.194 
The next time the Supreme Court used such a standard was in Estelle v. 
Gamble.195 In Estelle, a state prisoner filed a civil rights action against prison 
officials for failure to provide medical care.196 The Supreme Court held deliberate 
indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury constitutes cruel and 
punishment.197 The Court stated the Eighth Amendment prevents more than 
physically barbarous punishments, but also “embodies broad and idealistic concepts 
of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency. . . .”198 “Thus, we have held 
                                                           
 188 Id.  
 189 Id. at 103. 
 190 Id. at 99-100 (citation omitted). 
 191 Id. at 101-02.  
 192 Id. at 102-03. 
 193 Id. at 102-03 (footnotes omitted). 
 194 See id. 
 195 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 196 Id. at 98. 
 197 Id. at 104. 
 198 Id. at 102 (citations omitted). 
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repugnant to the Eighth Amendment punishments which are incompatible with ‘the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”199 
In 1988, the Supreme Court held Oklahoma's statute allowing execution of 
children under age sixteen constituted cruel and unusual punishment.200 In Thompson 
v. Oklahoma, the Court held executing children under age sixteen would “offend 
civilized standards of decency.”201 The Court, in discussing its duty to re-evaluate 
whether legislative decisions violate the standards of decency, stated: 
There would be little need for judges—and certainly no office for a 
philosophy of judging—if the boundaries of every constitutional 
provision were self-evident. They are not. . . . The world changes in 
which unchanging values find their application.  
. . . . 
We must never hesitate to apply old values to new circumstances. . . . The 
important thing, the ultimate consideration, is the constitutional freedom 
that is given into our keeping. A judge who refuses to see new threats to 
an established constitutional value, and hence provides a crabbed 
interpretation that robs a provision of its full, fair and reasonable meaning, 
fails in his judicial duty.202  
The Court held that standards of decency prevent execution of a child under age 
sixteen, citing to the laws of a dozen other countries, the American Bar Association, 
and the American Law Institute.203  
In Atkins v. Virginia,204 the Supreme Court held imposition of the death penalty 
for those suffering from mental retardation violated prevailing standards of decency. 
In holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids the death penalty for those suffering 
from mental retardation, the Court held such a punishment is excessive, stating: 
A claim that punishment is excessive is judged not by the standards that 
prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the “Bloody Assizes” 
or when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently 
prevail. . . . The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.205 
In evaluating whether a sentence violates the standards of decency for a maturing 
society, the Court looked at state’s recent legislative enactments on executing those 
suffering from mental retardation.206 The Court stated in the preceding sixteen years 
(from 1986 through 2002), nineteen different states passed legislation forbidding the 
                                                           
 199 Id. at 103 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01; 
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).  
 200 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 201 Id. at 830. 
 202 Id. at 830 n.4. 
 203 Id. at 830-31. 
 204 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  
 205 Id. at 311-12 (citations omitted). 
 206 Id. at 314. 
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execution of those with mental retardation.207 Even in the states that had not passed 
such legislation, the practice of executing those with mental retardation was 
uncommon.208 The Court stated, “[i]t is not so much the number of these States that 
is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change . . . provides powerful 
evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically 
less culpable than the average criminal . . . and it is fair to say that a national 
consensus has developed against it.”209 The Court declared in, “[c]onstruing and 
applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our >evolving standards of decency,= 
we . . . conclude that such punishment is excessive.”210  
Three years after Atkins, the Supreme Court held in Roper v. Simmons,211 the 
national consensus supported a categorical ban on imposing the death penalty for 
individuals under 18 at the time of their crime. The Court stated:  
The prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments,” like other 
expansive language in the Constitution, must be interpreted according to 
its text, by considering history, tradition, and precedent, and with due 
regard for its purpose and function in the constitutional design. To 
implement this framework we have established the propriety and affirmed 
the necessity of referring to “the evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society” to determine which punishments are 
so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual.212  
Following its methodology from Atkins, the Roper Court acknowledged there are 
thirty states prohibiting the death penalty for juveniles, twelve of which have 
abandoned the death penalty altogether, and eighteen expressly exclude juveniles.213 
Furthermore, of the twenty states allowing execution of juveniles, only six states had 
executed juveniles since 1989 and only three states since 1995.214 The Court also 
noted that the United States is one of eight countries in the world to execute a 
juvenile in the previous fifteen years.215 The Court concluded that an objective 
consensus exists against the juvenile death penalty among the States, an infrequency 
of its use even where it remains on the books, and consistency toward abolition of 
the practice.216 Therefore, the Court held the execution of any juvenile violated the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.217  
                                                           
 207 Id. at 314-15. 
 208 Id. at 316.  
 209 Id. at 315-16. 
 210 Id. at 321. 
 211 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 212 Id. at 560-61 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)). 
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In 2008, the Supreme Court held the Eighth Amendment also prohibited the 
death penalty for rape that did not result in the death of the victim. Kennedy v. 
Louisiana.218 In forbidding imposition of the death penalty for a non-homicide crime 
under the Eighth Amendment, the Court stated, whether this requirement has been 
fulfilled is determined not by the standards that prevailed when the Eighth 
Amendment was adopted in 1791 but by the norms that “currently prevail.”219 This is 
because “[t]he standard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily 
embodies a moral judgment. The standard itself remains the same, but its 
applicability must change as the basic mores of society change.”220 
In Graham v. Florida,221 the Supreme Court held the prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment is violated by sentencing a juvenile to life in prison without 
parole for a non-homicide crime. In Graham, a juvenile defendant, was convicted of 
burglary and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.222 The 
Supreme Court vacated his conviction and remanded the case based on Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.223 Justice Kennedy held, “to determine whether a 
punishment is cruel and unusual, courts must look beyond historical conceptions to 
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”224 
To determine the national consensus, the Court said it must begin with objective 
indicia.225 “[T]he clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary 
values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures.”226 However, the Court 
found legislation alone to be deficient on the issue, and chose to look at “actual 
sentencing practices [for] the Court’s inquiry into consensus.”227 The Court found 
sentences of life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders, are 
infrequent.228 
The Court stated an inquiry on national consensus must also consider whether the 
sentencing practice at issue serves legitimate penological goals.229 The Court went on 
to say “[w]ith respect to life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders, 
none of the goals of penal sanctions recognized as legitimate B retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation B provide an adequate justification.”230 
                                                           
 218 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008).  
 219 Id. at 419 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002)). 
 220 Id. (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C. J., dissenting)). 
 221 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 222 Id. at 2018-19. 
 223 Id. at 2034. 
 224 Id. at 2021 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 225 Id. at 2022. 
 226 Id. at 2023 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002); Penry v. Lynaugh, 
492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)). 
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Therefore, the Court struck down life without parole sentences for juveniles 
convicted of a non-homicide crime, assuch a sentence violates the national 
consensus and evolving standards of decency.  
As indicated by the Supreme Court’s holdings, detailed above, a sentence can 
violate the Eighth Amendment if it violates the national consensus or evolving 
standards of decency. Our national consensus and standards of decency are not 
stagnant, but are fluid and ever-changing concepts. To properly evaluate this 
threshold, the constitutionality of a sentence must be considered through current 
norms and values, not what our Founding Fathers may have done. To make such an 
assessment, the Supreme Court has looked to: sentencing practices of other 
countries231, legislative reforms by the states232, sentencing statistics233, and 
sentencing practices throughout the country.234 The Supreme Court has not placed 
any limits on what a court can consider in evaluating whether a sentence violates our 
national consensus or evolving standards of decency. In following these standards, 
failure to retroactively apply the FSA offends the national consensus and evolving 
standards of decency and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment.  
As detailed above, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 created the sentencing 
disparity between crack and powder cocaine. For twenty years, this disparity 
remained unchanged, but in 2007, the Sentencing Commission passed U.S.S.G. 
Amendment 706, which lowered base offense levels for crack cocaine offenses.235 
Soon after the passage of Amendment 706, the Supreme Court criticized the 
sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine in Spears v. United States.236 
In Spears, the Supreme Court that held district courts have the authority to reject the 
one hundred to one ratio altogether and replace it with a ratio the district court 
believes to be more accurate.237 After the Court’s holding in Spears, a number of 
federal courts rejected the crack-to-powder cocaine sentencing disparity and imposed 
an equal (or one to one) ratio in sentencing crack offenders.238 Soon thereafter the 
                                                           
 231 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 
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 232 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15; Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-65. 
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FSA was passed by Congress and signed by the President; then the Sentencing 
Commission further reduced the crack cocaine sentencing guidelines.239 
Therefore, even though the disparity between crack and powder cocaine has 
existed since the mid-1980s, significant erosion in the disparity between crack and 
powder cocaine has occurred in the last six years. Such drastic changes, endorsed by 
the Judiciary, Legislative, and Executive branches, represent a shift in the national 
consensus as to the severity of the crack cocaine penalties as compared to powder 
cocaine penalties.  
On September 18, 2013, the United States Sentencing Commission unanimously 
recommended to the Senate Judiciary Committee that the FSA be made 
retroactive.240 The Sentencing Commission is a bi-partisan seven-member group of 
federal judges who submit reports to Congress regarding the federal Sentencing 
Guidelines.241 In this report, the Commission submitted a report to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee on the impact of all mandatory minimums in federal 
sentencing.242 Included in this report was a unanimous recommendation the FSA be 
made retroactive.243 The Sentencing Commission detailed their previous efforts to 
conform the Sentencing Guidelines to the FSA’s new mandatory minimums, by 
passing U.S.S.G. Amendment 750.244 Commission also stated retroactive application 
of the FSA was consistent with the guideline amendments, as both served to 
“restor[e] fairness and reduc[e] disparities.”245 The Commission noted that 
retroactive application of the FSA would result in reductions for 8,829 inmates, with 
an average reduction of 53 months per inmate.246 Furthermore, of those potentially-
eligible, 87.7% are African-American.247 
Even the states have criticized their own legislative disparities between crack and 
powder cocaine. Ohio’s legislature has taken significant steps to reduce the disparity 
between crack and powder cocaine sentences. On June 29, 2011, Ohio Governor 
Kasich signed House Bill 86 into law, which completely eliminates Ohio’s 
sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine.248 On March 31, 2010, the 
South Carolina Senate approved sweeping reforms to its drug laws, reducing 
mandatory minimum sentences for first-time drug offenders, and eliminated 
sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine possession.249 Connecticut, 
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in 2005, passed Bill 6975, which ended the state’s disparity between crack and 
powder cocaine.250 Connecticut’s sentencing laws now apply to crack and powder 
cocaine equally; previously a conviction for selling half a gram of crack cocaine 
resulted in the same five-year sentence as twenty-eight grams of powder cocaine.251 
The state of Missouri had the largest crack to powder sentencing disparity among the 
states; in 2012, the Missouri legislature significantly reduced the disparity.252 Iowa 
previously had a one hundred to one crack to powder sentencing ratio, but in 2007 
reduced the disparity to ten to one.253 In total, of the thirteen states which had a 
sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine, nearly all had reduced this 
disparity by 2007.254 
These legislative changes reducing or eliminating the disparity between crack 
and powder cocaine at both the state and federal levels represent comprehensive and 
widespread change in the national consensus as to how our society views crack 
cocaine sentences. The erosion of the disparity between crack and powder cocaine 
represents that the punishments under 21 U.S.C. § 841 are now considered too harsh, 
and new standards have emerged in society. Therefore, failure to retroactively apply 
the FSA, and thereby maintaining the old discriminatory crack cocaine sentences, 
now offends the national consensus and violates the Eighth Amendment.  
VII. POLICY REASONS WHY THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT SHOULD BE RETROACTIVE 
As an attorney with the Office of the Federal Defender, this Author advocates for 
retroactivity of the FSA on behalf of his clients, as he currently represents clients 
who will receive a significant sentence reduction if the FSA were retroactively 
applied. He has multiple clients in the same position as Andre, mentioned earlier in 
our article, serving mandatory sentences under the pre-FSA penalties—some are 
even serving life sentences. As a citizen, not as an attorney representing his clients, 
there are significant reasons why the FSA should be retroactive. Obviously, there are 
arguments for equality, fairness, and a just result, but more tangibly, there are 
financial incentives for retroactivity of the FSA. Retroactively applying the FSA will 
literally save our country billions of dollars.  
There are currently two hundred and eleven thousand people in Bureau of 
Prisons facilities.255 For the fiscal year 2013 budget, the Department of Justice has 
                                                           
 250 Sub. H.B. 6975, 2005 Sess. (Conn. 2005), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/ 
ACT/Pa/pdf/2005PA-00248-R00HB-06975-PA.pdf. 
 251 Id. 
 252 Associated Press, Mo. Lawmakers Trim Disparity in Drug Sentences, KSHB.COM, May 
18, 2012, http://www.kshb.com/dpp/news/state/missouri/mo-lawmakers-trim-disparity-in- 
drug-sentences. 
 253 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING 
POLICY 98-99 (May 2007). 
 254 Id. at 104-07.  
 255 Quick Facts about the Bureau of Prisons, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 
http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp (last updated Oct. 26, 2013); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 
STATEMENT OF JUDGE SARIS, supra note 34, at 5. 
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requested that $8.6 billion go towards the Bureau of Prisons.256 About fifteen percent 
of all federal prisoners—about thirty thousand people—are serving sentences for 
crack cocaine offenses.257 About eighty-three percent of federal prisoners serving 
crack cocaine sentences are African-American.258 Thousands of these prisoners are 
incarcerated for life or for twenty, ten, or five years under mandatory minimum 
crack cocaine sentences imposed prior to the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act.259 
In fact, between January and August of 2010—before the passage of the FSA—
nearly four thousand defendants received mandatory minimum sentences for crack 
cocaine.260 The cost of housing a healthy inmate in 2011 was $2,407.78 per month, 
or $28,893.36 per year.261  
Thus, our federal prisons continue to house, and ultimately pay for, thousands of 
inmates who are serving sentences, which Congress has deemed to be unfair through 
its enactment of the FSA. This is an exorbitant waste of our tax dollars. Retroactive 
application of the FSA will ease this unnecessary fiscal strain.  
To put things into perspective, let us look at the Northern District of Ohio. In the 
Northern District of Ohio alone, there are currently about five hundred inmates 
currently serving time in federal prison for pre-FSA crack cocaine offenses.262 Due 
to the passage of the retroactive sentencing guideline amendment, U.S.S.G. 
Amendment 750, the Office of the Federal Defender was appointed to represent all 
five hundred inmates for potential sentence reduction motions, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2).263 In evaluating those potentially eligible, the Office of the Federal 
Defender has investigated and detailed all the relevant information from each 
defendant’s original sentencing hearing. As a result, the Office of the Federal 
Defender for the Northern District of Ohio has filed one hundred and fifty-three 
motions on behalf of those who are eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 
                                                           
 256 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2013 BUDGET REQUEST: PRISONS AND DETENTION 1, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013factsheets/prison-detention.pdf; U.S. SENT’G 
COMM’N, STATEMENT OF JUDGE SARIS, supra note 34, at 2, 6. 
 257 United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 485 (6th Cir. 2013); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF GUIDELINE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT OF 
2010 IF THE AMENDMENT WERE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY 12 (May 20, 2011) [hereinafter U.S. 
SENT’G COMM’N, ANALYSIS OF IMPACT]. 
 258 Id.; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATEMENT OF JUDGE SARIS, supra note 34, at 10. 
 259 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, ANALYSIS OF IMPACT, supra note 257, at tbl.1. 
 260 Blewett, 719 F.3d at 489; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.43 (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_ 
Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2010/sbtoc10.htm. 
 261 Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 78 Fed. Reg. 52 (Mar. 18, 
2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-03-18/html/2013-06139.htm. 
 262 Brief for Office of the Federal Defender for the Northern District of Ohio as Amicus 
Curiae at 3, Blewett, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15872 (6th Cir. July 11, 2013) (Nos. 12-5226, 
12-5582) [hereinafter Federal Defender as Amicus Curiae]. 
 263 Appointing the Office of the Federal Public Defender, Order No. 2011-24 (N.D. Ohio 
Oct. 4, 2011), available at http://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/assets/Rules_and_Orders/ 
General_Orders/2011-24.pdf. 
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§ 3582(c)(2).264 Of these, eighty-two motions have been granted and dozens are still 
pending before either district courts or on appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.265 The granted motions have resulted in an aggregate reduction of two 
thousand one hundred and ninety-five months of prison time.266 As the monthly cost 
to incarcerate someone in the Bureau of Prisons is $2,407.78 (on average for a 
healthy individual), these motions have saved the federal government approximately 
$5.3 million in the Northern District of Ohio alone. 
Many of these eighty-two defendants who have had motions granted were only 
able to receive a reduction to the pre-FSA mandatory and were unable to receive 
sentences below the mandatory minimum even though the FSA now exists. 
Additionally, there remain approximately two hundred and fifty other inmates who 
were unable to get any reduction as their sentence hinged on the pre-FSA mandatory 
minimum sentence. The cost savings in retroactively applying the FSA to these 
inmates is astounding. This author has gone through each and every of the five 
hundred inmates serving crack cocaine sentences. For each one, this author has 
calculated the new sentencing guidelines if the FSA’s statutory penalties were 
retroactively applied to their sentences; all other aspects of their original sentencing 
remain in place. Approximately three hundred of the defendants would be eligible 
for some reduction. Assuming each defendant received a sentence at the low-end of 
their new guideline range, the result would be an aggregate reduction of 15,915 
months in prison, which averages out to about fifty-three months per eligible 
inmate.267 This collective reduction equates to over $38 million in savings for the 
Bureau of Prisons’ budget. These tremendous savings would be associated with 
those three hundred inmates from the Northern District of Ohio alone. Given the fact 
that there are ninety-three federal districts, the savings nationwide for this minor 
change in the law would be billions of federal dollars.  
Moreover, this retroactive application is not a hand-out or a technicality 
conferred upon these inmates, it would merely be applying the current law to their 
sentences. Consistent with the FSA, such an initiative would be fair, not just to those 
serving prison sentences, but also fair to the American taxpayer. There is no reason 
why tax dollars should go to continue to incarcerate inmates serving unnecessarily 
long sentences, which Congress has determined to be unfair and discriminatory.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The passage of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 was a significant event for all 
defendants sentenced for crack cocaine offenses. The Act itself, as well as the 
litigation that has followed, has given rise to an opportunity for these defendants to 
seek relief. For both the precedent and policy reasons detailed above, the FSA should 
be made retroactive. Doing so will allow defendants like Andre to receive a fair and 
just sentence, which was the reason the FSA was passed in the first place.  
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 267 For purposes of calculation, a defendant serving a life sentence was designated a term of 
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31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
